Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for Balance in the Interpretation of the Division of Powers by Ryder, Bruce
The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 54 (2011) Article 20
Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The
Continuing Search for Balance in the Interpretation
of the Division of Powers
Bruce Ryder
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, bryder@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Ryder, Bruce. "Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for Balance in the Interpretation of the Division of
Powers." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 54. (2011).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol54/iss1/20
 
 
Equal Autonomy in Canadian 
Federalism: The Continuing Search 
for Balance in the Interpretation of 
the Division of Powers 
Bruce Ryder∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During most of the past decade, the justices of the Supreme Court of 
Canada have achieved and maintained a remarkable degree of consensus 
around their approach to the interpretation of the division of legislative 
powers in the Constitution Act, 1867.1 Since Beverley McLachlin’s 
appointment as Chief Justice in January 2000, the Court has been 
unanimous in its disposition of division of powers issues in 25 rulings or 
reference opinions.2 The Court was divided on the disposition of a 
division of powers issue in only one case between 2000 and 2008.3 
                                                                                                             
∗  Associate Professor and Assistant Dean First Year, Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University. I would like to thank my colleague Jamie Cameron for her thoughtful and helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank Ali Mirsky, J.D. Candidate, 
Osgoode Hall Law School, Class of 2013, for her excellent editorial and research assistance. 
1   (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
2  The 25 rulings or opinions, in chronological order, are: Global Securities Corp. v. British 
Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, 
per Iacobucci J., upholding challenged provision of the Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418); 
Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, 
issued by “the Court”, upholding the Firearms Act, S.C. 2005, c. 39, as a valid exercise of 
Parliament’s criminal law power); Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 
(S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per Iacobucci J., finding provincial casino program did not encroach on federal 
jurisdiction in relation to Aboriginal people); Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 66, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Gonthier J., finding provisions of 
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, paramount over conflicting provisions of B.C. Legal 
Profession Act, S.B.C. 1987, c. 25); Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002]  S.C.J. No. 21, 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per McLachlin C.J.C., finding challenged provision of 
Marine Mammal Regulations, SOR/93-56, to be a valid exercise of Parliament’s fisheries power); 
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J. 
No. 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per LeBel J., upholding challenged provisions of 
B.C. Heritage Conservation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 187); Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] 
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S.C.J. No. 45, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Iacobucci and Major JJ., upholding the 
application to Crown prosecutor of Code of Professional Conduct passed pursuant to Alberta’s Legal 
Profession Act, S.A. 1990, c. L-9.1); Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 69, 
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 6 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Major J., upholding the validity of the Manitoba statute 
regulating video lottery terminals); Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Bastarache J., finding that the provincial 
legislature has jurisdiction to endow administrative tribunals with the power to consider Aboriginal 
rights); R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) (9-0 
ruling finding prohibitions on marijuana to be a valid exercise of federal jurisdiction; Gonthier and 
Binnie JJ. wrote the principal opinion for 6; Arbour J., Deschamps J. and LeBel J. agreed in their 
opinions dissenting on Charter grounds); Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (S.C.C.) (9-0 opinion, issued by “the Court”, affirming that the proposed Civil 
Law Harmonization Act, S.C. 2001, c. 4, would be within Parliament’s jurisdiction to enact laws in 
relation to marriage); UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 
S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per LeBel J., finding the Quebec regulation respecting the colour of 
margarine to be a valid exercise of provincial jurisdiction in relation to local trade); Rothmans, 
Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Rothmans”] (9-0 ruling, per Major J., upholding the operation of provincial law 
regulating retail displays of tobacco products); Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. 
Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per Abella J., upholding the 
provincial component of the cooperative marketing scheme for chickens); British Columbia v. 
Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per 
Major J., upholding the B.C. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, 
c. 30, as a valid exercise of provincial jurisdiction); Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), 
ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per Deschamps J., 
upholding maternity and parental leave provisions of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996,  
c. 23); Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302 (S.C.C.) (9-0 
ruling, per LeBel J., upholding passing off civil action in federal Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985,  
c. T-13, as a valid exercise of Parliament’s trade and commerce power); Isen v. Simms, [2006] S.C.J. 
No. 41, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 349 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Rothstein J., finding that provincial law applies 
to negligence action involving a boat in a parking lot); Dunne v. Quebec (Deputy Minister of 
Revenue), [2007] S.C.J. No. 19, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 853 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per LeBel J., upholding 
the validity of Quebec law taxing partnership retirement benefits of non-residents); Canadian 
Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian 
Western Bank”] (7-0 ruling, per Binnie and LeBel JJ. for 6, finding Alberta’s Insurance Act, R.S.A. 
2000, c. I-3, applied to delivery of insurance services by banks; Bastarache J. wrote a separate 
concurring opinion); British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 
23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling finding a Vancouver by-law inoperative (per Binnie and 
LeBel JJ. for 6), or inapplicable (in Bastarache J.’s lone concurring opinion), to a cement mixing 
facility on port lands); Confédération des syndicats nationaux v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] 
S.C.J. No. 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per LeBel J., finding the challenged 
provisions of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23, to be within Parliament’s jurisdiction 
pursuant to s. 91(2A)); Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] S.C.J. No. 19, [2009] 1 
S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per Binnie J., upholding Ontario’s civil forfeiture statute as a valid 
exercise of provincial jurisdiction pursuant to s. 92(13)); NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services 
Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees’ Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 
696 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NIL/TU,O”] (9-0 ruling, per Abella J. for 6, finding the agency subject to 
provincial labour relations jurisdiction; McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. wrote a separate concurring 
opinion); Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child and Family 
Services of Toronto, [2010] S.C.J. No. 46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Native Child”] 
(9-0 ruling, per Abella J. for 6, finding an Aboriginal child welfare agency subject to provincial 
labour relations jurisdiction; McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. wrote a separate concurring opinion). 
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The judges on the McLachlin Court have been united around a com-
mitment to a modern, flexible vision of federalism that generously 
interprets both federal and provincial heads of legislative power. The 
Court tends to give the pith and substance, double aspect, ancillary 
powers and living tree doctrines liberal rein, thus promoting a great deal 
of overlap and interplay between federal and provincial laws in growing 
areas of de facto concurrent jurisdiction.4 In Abella J.’s words: “[t]oday’s 
constitutional landscape is painted with the brush of co-operative 
federalism … A co-operative approach accepts the inevitability of 
overlap between the exercise of federal and provincial competencies”.5 
Indeed, the Court has accorded legislators so much constitutional 
breathing space that, by 2010, it was becoming hard to remember the last 
time the Court ruled a law ultra vires on the grounds that it was in pith 
and substance in relation to the other level of government’s powers 
pursuant to sections 91 or 92.6  
                                                                                                             
3  R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.) (8-1 ruling, per Basta-
rache and Iacobucci JJ. for the majority, finding the challenged provisions of the Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to be within Parliament’s jurisdiction pursuant to s. 91(27); LeBel J. was alone 
in finding the provisions ultra vires on division of powers grounds). The Court also divided in R. v. 
Morris, [2006] S.C.J. No. 59, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915 (S.C.C.) (4-3 ruling, per Deschamps and Abella 
JJ. for the majority, finding that a provision of the B.C. Wildlife Act, S.B.C. 1982, c. 57, prohibiting 
hunting at night could not apply to the exercise of treaty rights by the accused hunters; McLachlin 
C.J.C. and Fish J. wrote the dissenting opinion). However, the different results reached by the 
majority and the dissent in Morris were a product of their different interpretations of the scope of the 
Aboriginal treaty right at issue, rather than differing approaches to the interpretation of the limits 
placed on provincial power by the division of legislative powers in the Constitution Act, 1867.  
4  This approach was comprehensively described and defended in the joint opinion of Bin-
nie and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2, at paras. 21-47. For a pre-Canadian 
Western Bank overview of these tendencies in the Court’s jurisprudence, see Bruce Ryder, “The End 
of Umpire? Federalism and Judicial Restraint” [hereinafter “Ryder”] in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & 
B. Ryder, eds. (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 345, esp. at 350-52.  
5  NIL/TU,O, supra, note 2, at para. 42. 
6  Some of us are old enough to remember. Before 2010, the last time a provincial or mu-
nicipal law was declared invalid on division of powers grounds was in 1993, when Nova Scotia 
abortion regulations were found to be an invasion of the federal criminal law power: R. v. 
Morgentaler, [1993] S.C.J. No. 95, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 (S.C.C.). As for federal statutes, apart from 
an inconsequential declaratory provision of the proposed Civil Marriage Act that the Court said 
would be ultra vires in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra, note 2, one has to go back to the 
early 1980s to find the Court declaring a federal statute ultra vires on division of powers grounds. 
See Reference re Proposed Federal Tax on exported Natural Gas, [1982] S.C.J. No. 52, [1982] 1 
S.C.R. 1004 (S.C.C.) (part of a proposed federal Bill ultra vires); Peel (Regional Municipality) v. 
Mackenzie, [1982] S.C.J. No. 58, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 9 (S.C.C.) (severing an invalid portion of the 
Criminal Code provision). If it helps to situate these rulings in the mists of time, the week Mackenzie 
was released, the song “Tainted Love” by Soft Cell was climbing the North American pop charts. 
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Because the Court was not striking down legislation on division of 
powers grounds, and because its rulings were almost always unanimous, 
the individual members of the McLachlin Court have had limited 
opportunities to stamp their distinct judicial personalities on federalism 
jurisprudence in the past decade. The epic constitutional battles of the 
past, featuring, for example, sharp divisions between six anglophone 
judges and three francophone judges from Quebec,7 or clashes between a 
strong centralist like Chief Justice Bora Laskin and a strong provincial 
autonomist like Justice Jean Beetz,8 seemed, well, a thing of the past.  
Some of us were lulled into imagining that the extended period of 
jurisprudential quiescence on the federalism front that prevailed on both 
sides of the turn of this century might endure. How wrong we were. 
The curtain started to be pulled back on the current Supreme Court 
justices’ differences on issues of provincial versus national power in the 
Court’s 2009 ruling in Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada 
Council of Teamsters.9 Out of the Court’s engagement with a prosaic 
issue — which level of government had jurisdiction over labour relations 
at a freight forwarding company — emerged profoundly contrasting 
views.  
Justice Rothstein, writing for a majority of six judges in Fastfrate, 
emphasized that the power-conferring provisions in sections 91 to 95 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 are “the bedrock of our federal system. They 
seek to preserve local diversity within the federal nation by conferring 
‘broad powers’ on provincial legislatures”.10 After undertaking a histori-
cal and textual analysis of section 92(10) of the Act, he stated that “the 
preference for diversity of regulatory authority over works and undertak-
ings should be respected”11 by treating federal jurisdiction “as the 
exception, rather than the rule”.12 He concluded that Fastfrate’s labour 
relations fell within provincial jurisdiction because its physical opera-
tions did not extend beyond provincial borders, even though the com-
                                                                                                             
7  See, e.g., Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission, 
[1977] S.C.J. No. 119, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.); Quebec (Public Service Board) v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [1977] S.C.J. No. 120, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 191 (S.C.C.). 
8  See, e.g., Reference re Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 
373 (S.C.C.). 
9  [2009] S.C.J. No. 53, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fastfrate”]. 
10  Id., at para. 29. 
11  Id., at para. 39. 
12  Id., at para. 44. See also para. 68: “a limited genus of works and undertakings should 
qualify as federal”. 
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pany provided interprovincial services to its customers through contrac-
tual arrangements with other carriers.13 
In dissent, Binnie J., with the concurrence of the Chief Justice and 
Fish J., reached the opposite conclusion starting from a very different 
normative premise. In Binnie J.’s view, Fastfrate’s activities and labour 
relations should be federally regulated because of the interprovincial 
nature of the services it provides. In contrast to Rothstein J.’s emphasis 
on the value of provincial diversity in the regulation of presumptively 
local works and undertakings, Binnie J.’s starting point was the desirabil-
ity, from a functional perspective, of a single uniform approach to 
regulation of transportation undertakings. “Checkerboard provincial 
regulation”, he wrote, “is antithetical to the coherent operation of a single 
functionally integrated indivisible national transportation service.”14 He 
rued “the sort of ‘originalism’ implicit” in Rothstein J.’s reliance on the 
drafting history of the 1867 Act, suggesting instead that constitutional 
powers “must now be applied in light of the business realities of 2009 
and not frozen in 1867”.15 In a telling aside, he referred to “[t]he persis-
tent feebleness of the federal power over trade and commerce and the 
eclipse of the federal authority related to peace, order and good govern-
ment.”16 This familiar lament echoes that of other frustrated centralists 
over the years, like Bora Laskin17 and Frank Scott.18 One could keep 
worse company.  
The divisions that emerged in the Fastfrate ruling proved to be a 
harbinger of things to come. Indeed, in all six federalism rulings released 
by the Supreme Court in 2010, the Court divided sharply on fundamental 
issues of principle. It was as if once the gloves came off in Fastfrate, 
pent up conflicts broke loose. Dissensus quickly emerged in place of the 
apparent harmony that had previously prevailed on the Court. 
                                                                                                             
13  Id., at paras. 69-80. 
14  Id., at para. 83. 
15  Id., at para. 89. 
16  Id. 
17  For a summary of Laskin’s views on federalism, see Katherine E. Swinton, The Supreme 
Court and Canadian Federalism: The Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990), esp. c. 8, 
“Laskin’s Centralist Vision”, and Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2005), esp. c. 9, “Federalism”. 
18  See Frank R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). 
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First, in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses,19 the Court split 5-4 on 
whether a federal environmental assessment of a mining project was 
required in addition to the assessment required under the terms of the 
James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. Justice Binnie, writing for 
the majority, found in favour of an additional federal assessment. The 
dissent of LeBel and Deschamps JJ. found that only a single provincial 
environmental assessment was consistent with the terms of the treaty. 
Justice Binnie accused the dissenters of reaching an “anomalous result”20 
that substituted “provincial paramountcy” for “cooperative federalism”.21 
For their part, the dissenters accused the majority of permitting “the 
federal government to unilaterally renege on its own solemn promises” in 
“stark contradiction to the honour of the Crown”.22 Gloves off indeed. 
Then, in a series of four rulings, two dealing with jurisdiction over 
labour relations at agencies providing Aboriginal child and family 
services in British Columbia and Ontario respectively,23 and two dealing 
with jurisdiction over the location of aerodromes in Quebec,24 the Court 
split on the appropriate role of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine 
following the Court’s reconsideration of the doctrine a few years earlier 
in Canadian Western Bank.25 Notably, in Lacombe and COPA, the 
                                                                                                             
19  [2010] S.C.J. No. 17, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.). 
20  Id., at para. 3. 
21  Id., at para. 13. 
22  Id., at para. 58. 
23  NIL/TU,O, supra, note 2 (9-0 ruling; Abella J. for six members of the Court found the 
Society subject to provincial labour relations jurisdiction without relying on the interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrine; McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by 
Binnie J., focused on the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine); Native Child, supra, note 2 (9-0 
ruling; the opinions of Abella J. and of McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. each took the same approach as 
in NIL/TU,O). 
24  Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lacombe”] (8-1 ruling; McLachlin C.J.C. for seven members of the Court 
found the by-law regulating the location of aerodromes invalid, and, even if valid, inapplicable; 
LeBel J. in his concurring opinion found the by-law valid and applicable but inoperative by virtue of 
the paramountcy doctrine; Deschamps J., dissenting, would have found the by-law valid, applicable 
and operative); Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 
39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “COPA”] (7-2 ruling; McLachlin C.J.C., writing for 
the majority, found that Quebec’s Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and 
agricultural activities, R.S.Q., c. P-41.1, had to be read down to prevent an impairment of a core 
aspect of exclusive federal jurisdiction in relation to aeronautics; LeBel and Deschamps JJ. wrote 
separate dissents finding the Act valid, applicable and operative). 
25  Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2. 
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aerodrome cases, two of the Quebec judges, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.,26 
criticized the Chief Justice’s majority opinion for taking an approach that 
it is antithetical to co-operative federalism,27 promotes “a more dualistic 
or even a more centralized form of federalism”, and “opens the door for 
predation upon provincial jurisdiction”.28  
Finally, in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act,29 the 
Court split 5-4 on the validity of the challenged provisions of the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act.30 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing 
for four members of the Court, found all of the challenged provisions to 
be a valid exercise of Parliament’s criminal law power. In their joint 
opinion, also for four members of the Court, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. 
found all of the challenged provisions to be beyond federal legislative 
jurisdiction. Justice Cromwell cast the deciding vote, upholding the 
“prohibited activities” provisions of the Act (thus forming a majority 
with the Chief Justice in this regard), but finding most of the provisions 
regulating “controlled activities” to be beyond the scope of the criminal 
law power (thus forming a majority with LeBel and Deschamps JJ. in 
this regard).  
As in the other recent divided federalism rulings, the mutual recrimi-
nations flew in the opinions in the AHRA Reference. The Chief Justice 
accused her colleagues of asserting “a new approach of provincial 
exclusivity that is supported by neither precedent nor practice”,31 one that 
circumscribed the purpose of the criminal law power, which is “to permit 
Parliament to create uniform norms”.32 In the view of LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ., the Chief Justice’s opinion “goes further than any 
previous judicial interpretation” of the criminal law power, essentially 
posing no limits and thus jeopardizing “the constitutional balance of the 
federal-provincial division of powers”.33 
                                                                                                             
26  Justice LeBel’s separate opinions in Lacombe and COPA each expressly concurred with 
Deschamps J.’s approach to the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. See Lacombe, supra, note 24, 
at para. 71; COPA, supra, note 24, at para. 76. 
27  Lacombe, id., at para. 116. 
28  Id., at para. 184. 
29  [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, 2010 SCC 61 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “AHRA Reference”]. 
30  S.C. 2004, c. 2, ss. 8-19, 40-53, 60-61, 68.  
31  AHRA Reference, supra, note 29, at para. 67. See also para. 76: “My colleagues break 
new ground in enlarging the judiciary’s role in assessing valid criminal objectives. It is ground on 
which I respectfully decline to tread.” 
32  Id., at para. 68. See also para. 77. 
33  Id., at para. 239. 
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In contrast to the common front the Court was able to present in the 
previous decade, the 2010 federalism rulings, in conjunction with the 
2009 ruling in Fastfrate, have revealed a sharply divided Court. The 
Court has an apparently “centralist” bloc led by McLachlin C.J.C., 
Binnie J. and Fish J., and an apparently “decentralist” bloc led by 
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. In the Court’s five most significant recent 
federalism rulings (Fastfrate, Moses, Lacombe, COPA and the AHRA 
Reference), the centralist bloc consistently took the position that favoured 
federal power, and the decentralist bloc, with the exception of LeBel J.’s 
concurrence based on the paramountcy doctrine in Lacombe, consistently 
took the position that favoured provincial power. In seeking to under-
stand these divisions and tendencies, and in considering the relative 
merits of the competing positions taken by the judges, we should not 
begin, as Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens urges in this volume, with 
an a priori commitment to either centralization or decentralization, “as if 
decentralization or centralization were abstractly valuable for their own 
sake”.34 Nor should we attribute to judges such a priori commitments, 
although their normative visions of the relative merits of centralization 
vs. decentralization in particular contexts will inevitably inform their 
commitment to constitutional interpretation. “Absolute neutrality”, as 
Gaudreault-DesBiens notes, “is illusory in such matters”.35 Nevertheless, 
we should seek to avoid “ideological determinism”36 and assess judicial 
decisions by reference to their fidelity to constitutional understandings of 
the federal principle itself. 
Why did the divisions on the Court emerge so starkly and suddenly 
in the past year? Arguably it was inevitable when one considers the 
general trends in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence and the nature of 
the issues presented by the cases described above — and indeed the 
nature of the issues it will be addressing in the Securities Reference37 
                                                                                                             
34  Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The ‘Principle of Federalism’ and the Legacy of 
the Patriation and Quebec Veto References” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
77, at 79 [hereinafter “Gaudreault-DesBiens 2011”]. See also Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, 
“The Irreducible Federal Necessity of Jurisdictional Autonomy, and the Irreducibility of Federalism 
to Jurisdictional Autonomy”, in Sujit Choudhry, Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens & Lorne 
Sossin, eds., Dilemmas of Solidarity: Redistribution in the Canadian Federation (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006) 185. 
35  Gaudreault-DesBiens 2011, id. 
36  Id., at 115 n. 139. 
37  In the Matter of a Reference by Governor in Council concerning the proposed Canadian 
Securities Act, as set out in Order in Council, P.C. 2010-667, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 190 (S.C.C.). 
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(heard and reserved on April 13 and 14, 2011) and did address in the 
recent decision in PHS Community Services.38 
The recent cases land on terrain that exposes two features of the doc-
trinal structure of the Court’s division of powers jurisprudence that pose 
basic threats to the federal principle. The first is the interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrine, the problematic features of which LeBel and Binnie 
JJ. exposed and critiqued at length in Canadian Western Bank.39 The 
second is the use of the pith and substance doctrine, the ancillary powers 
doctrine, the double aspect doctrine and the living tree doctrine to extend 
the scope of areas subject to de facto concurrent jurisdiction. 
II. THE NEED TO MEASURE THE JURISPRUDENCE  
AGAINST THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE 
Federalism is one of the five foundational principles of the Canadian 
Constitution that have been identified by the Supreme Court of Canada.40 
It “dictate[s] major elements of the architecture of the Constitution itself” 
and is part of “its lifeblood”.41 The Court has accorded federalism and 
the other fundamental constitutional principles special interpretive 
significance. Not only do they assist in the interpretation of the constitu-
tional text,42 they can also be used to fill gaps in the express terms of the 
Constitution.43 Given the superordinate normative status accorded to the 
restricted number of fundamental, structural constitutional principles, we 
should measure not just the text, but also the accumulated body of 
judicial interpretation of the text against the demands of those principles. 
When the judiciary uses fundamental constitutional principles to fill the 
                                                                                                             
38  PHS Community Services Society v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] B.C.J. No. 57, 
2010 BCCA 15 (B.C.C.A.), affd [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”]. 
39  Supra, note 2, at paras. 35-47. 
40  Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Court of Prince Edward Island; Reference re 
Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island; R. v. 
Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister 
of Justice), [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Provincial Judges 
Reference”]; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Secession Reference”]. 
41  Secession Reference, id., at para. 51. 
42  Id., at para. 52. 
43  Id., at para. 53. As Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens demonstrates in his contribution 
to this volume, the Court has not always defined the federal principle clearly or accorded it 
consistent interpretive weight in its constitutional jurisprudence: see Gaudreault-DesBiens 2011, 
supra, note 34. 
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gaps in the constitutional text, it is engaged in a task that raises profound 
questions of democratic legitimacy: normally, gaps in the text of the 
supreme law should be filled through democratically accountable constitu-
tional amendment procedures rather than by the judges expanding the 
sphere of constitutional supremacy without a clear mandate to do so.44  
In contrast, the need to measure the rules and principles developed 
by the courts when interpreting the constitutional text against the 
evolving understandings of the demands of fundamental constitutional 
principles, and to adjust the jurisprudence to align with those fundamen-
tal principles when departures from them are detected, are common and 
generally accepted features of Canadian constitutional scholarship, legal 
argument and judicial practice. This paper seeks to contribute to this 
tradition by arguing that several doctrinal features of Canadian constitu-
tional jurisprudence are at odds with the superordinate normative 
significance the Court has accorded to the principle of federalism and are 
therefore in need of judicial revision to achieve better alignment or 
coherence in the jurisprudence as a whole, and, more importantly, to 
better safeguard the basic objectives of our constitutional design. 
III. THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE AND EQUAL AUTONOMY 
According to the federal principle, federal and provincial govern-
ments are coordinate (or equal in status) and autonomous within their 
respective spheres of jurisdiction.45 Thus, judicial interpretation of the 
division of powers that is faithful to the federal principle will give equal 
weight and consideration to the respective claims of provincial legisla-
tures and the federal Parliament when they seek to exercise their auton-
omy to pursue distinct policy objectives within their respective spheres 
of guaranteed and exclusive legislative jurisdiction. In other words, 
implicit in the federal principle is the principle of equal autonomy.  
                                                                                                             
44  See Jean Leclair, “Canada’s Unfathomable Constitutional Principles” (2002) 27 Queen’s 
L.J. 389; Jamie Cameron, “The Written Word and the Constitution’s Vital Unstated Assumptions”, 
in Pierre Thibault, Benoit Pelletier & Louis Perret, eds., Essays in Honour of Gérald A. Beaudoin 
(Yvon Blais, 2002), at 89. See also the dissent of La Forest J. in the Provincial Judges Reference, 
supra, note 40, at paras. 314-319. 
45  This is a widely accepted definition. See, e.g., Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 
(Toronto: Carswell, looseleaf), c. 5.1(a) [hereinafter “Hogg”], quoting Kenneth Clinton Wheare, 
Federal Government, 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), at 10 [hereinafter 
“Wheare”]. 
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This principle of equal autonomy is apparent in many features of 
Canadian federalism jurisprudence. For example, the principle of equal 
autonomy generates a symmetrical application of basic principles of 
interpretation (such as the living tree, pith and substance, double aspect 
and ancillary powers doctrines)46 to both federal and provincial heads of 
powers. These principles give generous, flexible and dynamic scope to 
federal and provincial powers alike.47 The principle of equal autonomy is 
reflected in the courts’ long-standing rejection of a hierarchical concep-
tion of federalism, one that would accord superior status or significance 
to federal as compared to provincial powers, or vice versa.48 Instead, 
when interpreting the division of powers, the courts conceive of Parlia-
ment and the provincial legislatures as being in a coordinate or horizontal 
relationship. They are equal in status; neither is subordinate to the 
other.49  
Consider, for example, the carefully constructed symmetry of Lord 
Sankey’s famous dictum in the “Persons” case that the Constitution Act, 
1867 (as it is now known) should be given “a large and liberal interpreta-
tion so that the Dominion to a great extent, but within certain fixed 
limits, may be mistress in her own house, as the Provinces to a great 
                                                                                                             
46  Whether the courts’ commitment, in theory, to applying these doctrines symmetrically to 
federal and provincial powers is reflected in practice is open to debate that should be informed by 
sustained examinations of the pattern of results in the case law. Justice Deschamps, for one, is not 
convinced: in Lacombe, supra, note 24, at para. 104, she stated that “in practice” the ancillary 
powers doctrine has “tended to benefit mainly the central government, and to such an extent that it 
has upset the balance of Canadian federalism” (citing Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie 
Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 5th ed. (Cowansville, QC: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008), at 452-54). 
47  See Ryder, supra, note 4. 
48  One of the best-known formulations is Lord Watson’s in Maritime Bank of Canada  
(Liquidators of) v. New Brunswick (Receiver-General), [1892] J.C.J. No. 1, [1892] A.C. 437, at 441 
(P.C.):  
The object of the Act was neither to weld the provinces into one, nor to subordinate provin-
cial governments to a central authority, but to create a federal government in which they 
should all be represented, entrusted with the exclusive administration of affairs in which 
they had a common interest, each province retaining its independence and autonomy. 
49  This conception of Canadian federalism is imperfectly embodied in the constitutional 
text, which contains a number of important features (such as the declaratory, disallowance and 
reservation powers) that are inconsistent with the federal principle. These features led K.C. Wheare 
to describe the Canadian Constitution as “quasi-federal”: Wheare, supra, note 45, at 19. However, 
other elements of the constitutional text are faithful to the federal principle as equal autonomy, and, 
more importantly, Canadian political practice has evolved in a strongly federalist direction, calling 
into question the continued legitimacy of the quasi-federal elements of the constitutional text. See 
Hogg, supra, note 45, at c. 5.3. 
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extent, but within certain fixed limits, are mistresses in theirs”.50 Consis-
tent with the identity of language Lord Sankey used to describe federal 
and provincial jurisdiction, the courts aim to give equal weight and 
consideration to federal and provincial claims to autonomy.  
The courts’ frequent references to the need to preserve “balance” in 
the division of powers are likewise a reflection of their concern to protect 
and promote the federal principle understood as the protection and 
promotion of equal autonomy.51 For example, in the 1993 Ontario 
Hydro52 ruling, Iacobucci J., in his dissenting opinion for three members 
of the Court, concluded that the federal declaratory power in section 
92(10)(c) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which enables the federal 
Parliament to enact legislation unilaterally lifting local works out of 
provincial and into federal jurisdiction, should be interpreted narrowly in 
light of its conflict with modern conceptions of federalism. The principle 
of equal autonomy inherent in the federal principle animated his opinion. 
As he put it:  
[A narrow approach to the declaratory power is] consistent with the 
traditional approach to division of powers questions which has been 
one of balancing federal and provincial powers through the application 
of doctrines such as mutual modification, double aspect and pith and 
substance. The Constitution Act, 1867 set up a federalist system of 
government for Canada and should be interpreted so as not to allow the 
powers of either Parliament or the provincial legislatures to subsume 
the powers of the other.53  
                                                                                                             
50  Reference re British North America Act, 1867, [1929] J.C.J. No. 2, [1930] A.C. 124, at 
136 (P.C.). 
51  For example, in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] 
S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.), Dickson C.J.C. repeatedly invoked the need to maintain 
balance when interpreting federal and provincial powers in relation to the regulation of trade. He 
emphasized the need “to maintain a delicate balance between federal and provincial power” (at para. 32) 
and noted that “[b]oth provincial and federal governments have equal ability to legislate in ways that may 
incidentally affect the other government’s sphere of power” (at para. 45). Concerns about preserving 
balance in the division of powers have likewise figured prominently in many of the major rulings on the 
federal division of legislative powers: for notable examples, see the opinion of Beetz J. in Reference re 
Anti-Inflation Act (Can.), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (S.C.C.), as well as the opinions in R. 
v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hydro-
Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.); and AHRA Reference, supra, note 29. See 
also Fastfrate, supra, note 9, per Rothstein J., at para. 30: “Federalism exists as a fine balance between 
local governance and centralized decision making.” 
52  Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 
S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.). 
53  Id., at para. 138. 
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Justice La Forest’s opinion, also for three members of the Court, dis-
agreed with Iacobucci J.’s use of the federal principle to restrict a federal 
power, like the declaratory power, that is explicitly conferred by the 
constitutional text and that reflects a hierarchical or colonial conception 
of federalism (he noted that the disallowance and reservation powers are 
other examples of powers inconsistent with contemporary understand-
ings of federalism as equal autonomy). Notwithstanding the judges’ 
disagreement regarding exceptional unilateral powers like the declaratory 
power, La Forest J. outlined common ground with the majority when he 
asserted that 
[generally courts] have an important, indeed essential, role in balancing 
federalism as they go about their task of defining the nature and effect 
of those great but more subtle powers, not susceptible of definition and 
direction by those elemental political forces that undergird Canadian 
federalism.54  
Despite the courts’ emphasis on balance and a symmetrically gener-
ous approach to the interpretation of federal and provincial powers, some 
of the doctrinal features of Canadian federalism jurisprudence are in 
tension with the modern conception of federalism founded on equal 
respect for the autonomy of federal and provincial legislative bodies. The 
paramountcy doctrine, for example, holds that in the case of conflicts 
between valid federal and provincial laws, the federal law will prevail by 
rendering the provincial law inoperative to the extent of the inconsis-
tency. Insofar as the catalogues of legislative powers in sections 91 and 
92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 are concerned, this rule is a product of 
judicial interpretation, as these constitutional provisions are silent on 
how to resolve conflicts between overlapping exercises of federal and 
provincial legislative powers. The equal autonomy principle would not 
give primacy as a general rule to either federal or provincial legislation, 
as to do so is to accord greater weight to the autonomy of one level of 
government. Instead, the equal autonomy principle might give primacy 
to federal jurisdiction in some contexts and to provincial jurisdiction in 
others, depending on the relative importance of the national or provincial 
interests at stake. Or, it might give primacy, on a case-by-case basis, to 
whichever law is most closely connected to the constitutional role and 
policy objectives of the enacting legislature. However, a strong argument 
                                                                                                             
54  Id., at para. 73. 
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can be made that practical considerations related to predictability and 
promoting compliance with the rule of law require us to choose between 
a general rule of federal paramountcy or a general rule of provincial 
paramountcy. And, if we are so forced to choose, the interests of the 
whole will generally be greater than the interests of a part; hence the 
common adoption of a rule of federal paramountcy in federations. For 
this reason, in the context of the paramountcy rule, concerns in Canada 
about equal autonomy are most often expressed not as a frontal attack on 
the judicially created rule that gives primacy to federal legislation in 
cases of conflict, but as a demand that the rule be given a narrow scope 
to avoid unduly limiting provincial autonomy.55  
While previously the Court had limited the paramountcy doctrine to 
situations where it was impossible to comply with overlapping federal 
and provincial laws, the Court has expanded the occasions on which the 
doctrine will be invoked to include situations where provincial laws are 
incompatible with federal legislative purposes.56 A valid provincial law 
will be rendered inoperative, therefore, even if it is possible to comply 
with it without violating federal law, and even if the provincial law 
expresses an important local concern vital to a matter within the prov-
ince’s constitutionally guaranteed exclusive areas of jurisdiction, so long 
as the provincial law frustrates a federal legislative purpose, no matter 
how trivial. The result of this expansion of the occasions on which the 
federal paramountcy rule can be invoked is that the exercise of provincial 
autonomy in areas of shared jurisdiction is rendered dependent upon the 
will of the federal Parliament. If one of Parliament’s policy objectives is 
to oust provincial legislation entirely from an area of shared jurisdiction, 
then apparently all it has to do is say so.57 
                                                                                                             
55  See, e.g., Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 
(S.C.C.), per Dickson J. (as he then was), at 188, quoting Professor Hogg:  
The argument that it is untidy, wasteful and confusing to have two laws when only one is 
needed reflects a value which in a federal system often has to be subordinated to that of 
provincial autonomy.  
See also Lacombe, supra, note 24, at para. 119, per Deschamps J.:  
The unwritten constitutional principle of federalism and its underlying principles of 
co-operative federalism and subsidiarity favour a strict definition of the concept of con-
flict. The decision to limit the scope of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity must 
mean that there is more room to apply the rules of governments at both levels, but the 
achievement of this objective can easily be compromised by a lax or vague definition of 
the concept of conflict. 
56  See, e.g., Rothmans, supra, note 2, at paras. 11-14. 
57  See the discussion in Ryder, supra, note 4, at 369-77. 
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Because the federal paramountcy rule appears to be premised on a 
general rule that it is of greater importance to uphold the operation of 
valid federal legislation than it is to uphold the operation of valid 
provincial legislation, the rule does not obviously square with the federal 
principle or its corollary, the principle of equal autonomy. Since that 
departure can be justified by reference to other important values, along 
the lines briefly sketched above, and because the paramountcy rule did 
not figure prominently in the 2010 rulings that are the focus of this 
volume, we will leave further exploration of the paramountcy doctrine 
per se to another occasion. But let us not lose sight here of the signifi-
cance of the judicial adoption of a rule of federal paramountcy when it 
operates in conjunction with other features of Canadian federalism 
jurisprudence. In particular, when coupled with the trend towards 
expansion of areas subject to de facto concurrent power that results from 
the liberal deployment of the living tree, pith and substance, double 
aspect and ancillary powers doctrines, the rule of federal paramountcy 
poses a serious threat to provincial autonomy. We will return to this 
significant concern below. Before, though, let us turn to a consideration 
of another doctrinal feature of Canadian federalism that is seriously at 
odds with the federal principle: the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. 
IV. EQUAL AUTONOMY AND THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL  
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
The interjurisdictional immunity doctrine holds that provincial laws 
that are in pith and substance in relation to matters within exclusive 
provincial jurisdiction, and therefore valid, must nevertheless be read 
down, or restricted in their application, to the extent necessary to prevent 
them from impairing matters at the core of federal heads of power. The 
doctrine is premised on a strong interpretation of the meaning of “exclu-
sivity” — as a bubble of immunity from impairment — at least insofar as 
the core of federal heads of power is concerned.  
The federal and provincial heads of power in sections 91 and 92 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 are both described in the text as “exclusive”. 
Most of the time, the courts employ the pith and substance, double aspect 
and ancillary powers doctrine to interpret the meaning of exclusivity in a 
weaker manner: exclusivity means the exclusive ability to pass laws that 
deal predominantly with a subject matter allocated to the enacting 
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legislature’s jurisdiction. According to the pith and substance doctrine, so 
long as the dominant or most important characteristic of a law falls 
within a class of subjects allocated to the jurisdiction of the enacting 
legislature, the law will be held to be intra vires, even if it has spillover, 
or incidental effects, in areas outside of its jurisdiction.58 Overlap and 
interplay between federal and provincial laws is to be expected and 
welcomed in a modern federal state. The Court has characterized this 
approach as the “dominant tide” of constitutional interpretation.59 The 
Court takes this dominant, liberal approach to the pith and substance 
doctrine, one that is tolerant of spillover effects on the other level of 
government’s exclusive legislative jurisdiction, when assessing the 
constitutional validity of either federal or provincial laws.60  
The interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, on the other hand, is 
premised on a stronger understanding of exclusivity, one that does not 
tolerate any spillover effects if they would have the effect of impairing a 
matter at the core of the other level of government’s legislative powers.61 
In contrast to the pith and substance, double aspect and ancillary powers 
doctrines, which lean in the direction of expansive interpretations of 
federal and provincial legislative powers alike, the interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrine operates only in favour of federal heads of power. If 
Parliament’s legislative powers set out in section 91 are truly exclusive, 
the reasoning goes, they cannot be impaired at their core by provincial 
legislation. This is so even if the federal power remains unexercised, 
because the doctrine protects the strong sense of exclusivity at the core of 
the power, not the manner of its exercise.62 As Beetz J. explained in his 
defence of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in Bell Canada 
(1988),63 if a “power is exclusive, it is because the Constitution, which 
                                                                                                             
58  See Bruce Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federal-
ism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308, at 325 
[hereinafter “Ryder, ‘Demise and Rise’”] (describing this approach to exclusivity and its implica-
tions as the “modern paradigm”). 
59  O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, 
at 17 (S.C.C.); Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2, at paras. 35-37. 
60  See, e.g., the case discussed in Ryder, supra, note 4. 
61  Id., at 322, describing this approach to exclusivity and its implications as the “classical 
paradigm”. 
62  Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2, at para. 34. 
63  Bell Canada v. Québec (Commission de santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec), 
[1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter, “Bell Canada 1988”]. 
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could have been different but is not, expressly specifies this to be the 
case”.64 
A glaring omission in Beetz J.’s reasoning is his failure to grapple 
with the fact that provincial heads of power in section 92 of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867 are, like the section 91 heads of power, described as 
“exclusive” in the text. The Constitution could have been different, but it 
is not. The federal principle and its corollary, the equal autonomy 
principle, combined with Beetz J.’s reasoning, leads to the conclusion 
that the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine should be employed in a 
reciprocal or symmetrical fashion: valid federal legislation must be read 
down so as not to impair matters at the core of provincial jurisdiction. 
Yet the doctrine has never been applied to protect the core of provincial 
heads of power from federal impairment. It has operated in a decidedly 
one-way fashion to protect only federal heads of power from provincial 
impairment. As Binnie and LeBel JJ. acknowledged in Canadian Western 
Bank:  
In theory, the doctrine is reciprocal: it applies both to protect provincial 
heads of power and provincially regulated undertakings from federal 
encroachment, and to protect federal heads of power and federally 
regulated undertakings from provincial encroachment. However, it 
would appear that the jurisprudential application of the doctrine has 
produced somewhat “asymmetrical” results. Its application to federal 
laws in order to avoid encroachment on provincial legislative authority 
has often consisted of “reading down” the federal enactment or federal 
power without too much doctrinal discussion, e.g., Attorney General of 
Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, 
Dominion Stores Ltd. v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 844, and Labatt 
Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada, [1980] 1 
S.C.R. 914. In general, though, the doctrine has been invoked in favour 
of federal immunity at the expense of provincial legislation: Hogg, at  
p. 15-34.65 
The suggestion that the doctrine has produced “somewhat” asymmet-
rical results is a gross understatement. It has served only to place limits 
on the application of valid provincial laws, and it has done so in a wide 
range of significant contexts. I am not aware of any Supreme Court or 
                                                                                                             
64  Id., at para. 251. The weaknesses of Beetz J.’s position have been thoroughly explored in 
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2, at paras. 42-47, per Binnie and LeBel JJ. See also Ryder, 
“Demise and Rise”, supra, note 58, at 351-52 and 356-58.  
65  Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 35. 
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other appellate level ruling (apart from the ruling of the B.C. Court of 
Appeal recently reversed on this point by the Supreme Court)66 that has 
cited the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, or discussed cores of 
provincial heads of power that are immune from federal impairment, as a 
reason to restrict the application of valid federal statutes. To say, as 
Binnie and LeBel JJ. did in the above quoted passage, that there was not 
“too much doctrinal discussion” in the three cases they cite as examples 
of instances where federal laws were read down similarly depicts the 
situation too mildly. There was no discussion of the interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrine in those cases. Nor was there any discussion of the 
appropriateness of using “reading down” as a remedy to limit the 
encroachment of federal statutes on areas of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction. 
Let us briefly examine the three cases cited by Binnie and LeBel JJ. 
in support of what they see as some traces of reciprocity or symmetry in 
the Court’s approach to exclusivity, and thus of at least some consistency 
in this area of the Court’s jurisprudence with the federal principle as 
equal autonomy.  
First, in Canada (Attorney General) v. Law Society of British Colum-
bia (commonly known as the Jabour case),67 at issue was whether the 
federal Combines Investigation Act68 could apply to disciplinary proceed-
ings initiated by the Law Society of British Columbia against a lawyer, 
Donald Jabour, who had advertised his practice contrary to the Law 
Society’s rules at the time. Justice Estey, writing for the Court, rejected 
the argument made by counsel for the appellant (who was, coinciden-
tally, the future Binnie J.) that the federal statute applied to the provincial 
proceedings. Justice Estey reached this conclusion as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation. He wrote that 
[w]hen a federal statute can be properly interpreted so as not to 
interfere with a provincial statute, such an interpretation is to be applied 
in preference to another applicable construction which would bring 
about a conflict between the two statutes.69  
For that reason, he concluded that the challenged provision of the federal 
Act “does not apply to the Law Society in the circumstances of this 
                                                                                                             
66  Supra, note 38. 
67  [1982] S.C.J. No. 70, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jabour”]. 
68  R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23. 
69  Supra, note 67, at 356. 
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appeal”70 and, as a result, it was not necessary to answer the question 
regarding the constitutional validity of the statute.71  
In the second case cited by Binnie and LeBel JJ., Dominion Stores,72 
at issue was whether a grocery store could be convicted for using a grade 
name (“Canada Extra Fancy”) without complying with the stipulations 
set out in federal legislation. Writing for the majority opinion in a 5-4 
ruling, Estey J. found the statute invalid as an invasion of provincial 
jurisdiction in relation to intra-provincial trade. He thus acquitted 
Dominion Stores, for reasons he summarized in the following passage: 
It is not necessary to determine, in my view, whether Part I [of the 
challenged legislation] is ultra vires the Parliament of Canada in toto 
and we are not invited by the appellant to do so. It is sufficient if it is 
found to be inapplicable to the events as alleged in the charge laid 
against the appellant under the federal statute. It may be that Part I has 
at least a partial validity in that the grading program of s. 3 is 
integrated with the international and interprovincial trade program 
which is the subject of Part II of the statute, but in my view, s. 3 has 
no validity in relation to purely intraprovincial transactions and in that 
respect is ultra vires.73 
In his dissent in Dominion Stores, Laskin C.J.C. would have upheld 
the validity of the federal legislation, and its application to the intra-
provincial transactions at issue, as a logical extension of Parliament’s 
jurisdiction over interprovincial and international trade. The majority and 
                                                                                                             
70  Id., at 359. 
71  Id., at 362. Robin Elliot argues that the Jabour ruling “bears a very close resemblance to” 
interjurisdictional immunity cases. See Robin Elliot, “Constitutional Law — Division of Powers — 
Interjurisdictional Immunity, Reading Down and Pith and Substance: Ontario Public Service 
Employees Union v. Attorney-General for Ontario” (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 523, at 542 [hereinafter 
“Elliot 1988”]. See also Robin Elliot, “Interjurisdictional Immunity after Canadian Western Bank 
and Lafarge Canada Inc.: The Supreme Court Muddies the Doctrinal Waters — Again” (2008) 43 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 433, at 473, n. 175 [hereinafter “Elliot 2008”]. With respect, any resemblance of the 
reasoning in Jabour to existing interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is difficult to discern. 
72  R. v. Dominion Stores Ltd., [1979] S.C.J. 131, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.). 
73  Id., at 865-66. Robin Elliot cites the quoted passage as evidence that the Dominion Stores 
ruling bears a close resemblance to interjurisdictional immunity cases that found provincial statutes 
to be inapplicable to core elements of federal legislative powers: Elliot 1988, supra, note 71, at 542, 
n. 72 and accompanying text. With respect, the use by Estey J. of the word “inapplicable” in 
tailoring a minimalist remedy sufficient to meet the appellant’s interest in escaping prosecution does 
not transform a case about validity into a case about restricting the application of otherwise valid 
statutes. More recently, Professor Elliot has acknowledged that Dominion Stores is a case about 
validity and “therefore should not have been cited” by Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western 
Bank as an example of “reading down” otherwise valid federal statutes to protect exclusive 
provincial jurisdiction. See Elliot 2008, supra, note 71, at 473, n. 175. 
584 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
dissenting opinions thus disagreed about the validity of the challenged 
federal legislation.  
Finally, in Labatt,74 at issue was whether Parliament had jurisdiction 
to enact legislation establishing compositional standards for foods and 
beverages. The majority opinion of Estey J. found the challenged 
provisions of the Food and Drugs Act invalid. Parliament did not have 
jurisdiction to adopt detailed “legal recipes”75 regulating a single trade or 
industry. The dissenting opinions would have upheld the challenged 
provisions as a valid exercise of the federal trade and commerce power. 
Thus, as in the Court’s ruling in Dominion Stores, the disagreement 
between the majority and the dissenting opinions in Labatt related to the 
validity of the challenged legislation.76 
In summary, the three cases cited by Binnie and LeBel JJ. do not 
provide support for the proposition that federal laws have been read 
down to avoid encroachment on provincial legislative authority. None of 
the opinions in Jabour, Dominion Stores or Labatt made any mention of 
using constitutional principles to limit the applicability of otherwise valid 
federal legislation, or of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, or of 
using the reading down remedy to protect a core of provincial jurisdic-
tion from impairment by a valid federal statute. Rather, one of these 
cases used statutory interpretation principles to read down a federal 
statute to avoid a conflict with provincial legislation (Jabour) and the 
other two found federal legislation invalid as an invasion of provincial 
jurisdiction in relation to intra-provincial trade (Labatt and Dominion 
Stores). Thus, one must look elsewhere for evidence of symmetry or 
reciprocity in the courts’ use of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, 
or of related reasoning restricting the application of federal statutes to 
prevent encroachments on matters assigned by the Constitution to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces.  
In fairness to Binnie and LeBel JJ., the results in Jabour, Dominion 
Stores and Labatt provide evidence of the fact that the courts have legal 
tools at their disposal that can be used to protect exclusive provincial 
legislative powers from encroachment by federal legislation, even if they 
                                                                                                             
74  Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1979] S.C.J. No. 134, 
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 914 (S.C.C.). 
75  Id., at 943. 
76  Robin Elliot agrees that the Labatt ruling was based on a finding of invalidity rather than 
a finding of restricted applicability of an otherwise valid federal statute. See Elliot 2008, supra, note 
71, at 473, n. 175. 
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eschew any reliance on, or mention of, concepts of constitutional 
inapplicability or interjurisdictional immunity to accomplish that 
objective. Nevertheless, these same tools are also available to protect 
exclusive federal legislative powers from encroachment by provincial 
legislation. The problem remains that another powerful tool frequently 
resorted to by the courts, namely the interjurisdictional immunity 
doctrine, is used only to protect the exclusivity of federal powers in a 
strong sense. Treating provincial legislative powers as less exclusive is 
not consistent with the federal principle or its corollary, the principle of 
equal autonomy. 
Like Binnie and LeBel JJ., Robin Elliot is of the view that some case 
law supports “reading down” federal legislation to protect the exclusivity 
of provincial jurisdiction, even if those cases do not use the language of 
interjurisdictional immunity per se. In several articles that undertake a 
careful and detailed review of the case law,77 Elliot defends the inter-
jurisdictional immunity doctrine from its critics, essentially agreeing 
with Beetz J. that the doctrine is necessary to give meaning to the 
exclusivity of constitutional powers. Unlike Beetz J., and like Binnie and 
LeBel JJ., Elliot acknowledges that the federal principle requires that the 
doctrine operate in a reciprocal or symmetrical manner to protect the 
core of both federal and provincial powers from impairment. Thus, he 
applauds “the reaffirmation of the doctrine’s legitimacy” in Canadian 
Western Bank and “the recognition that, as a matter of principle, the 
doctrine should operate to protect core areas of provincial as well as 
federal jurisdiction”.78 
In his account of the cases and the jurisprudence, Elliot strains to 
minimize the doctrine’s incompatibility, in theory and practice, with the 
federal principle. Like Binnie and LeBel JJ., he notes that a number of 
cases have employed the reading down remedy to limit the application of 
federal statutes to prevent encroachment on exclusive provincial jurisdic-
tion.79 Even if these cases do not refer to the interjurisdictional immunity 
doctrine, he argues, the effect is the same.80 The problem is that the 
number and significance of the cases that Elliot cites in support of the 
                                                                                                             
77  Elliot 1988, supra, note 71; Elliot 2008, supra, note 71. 
78  Elliot 2008, id., at 481. 
79  Elliot 1988, supra, note 71, at notes 70-75 and accompanying text; Elliot 2008, id., at 
468-69. 
80  The reading down doctrine and the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, Elliot contends, 
“seem simply to be different ways of describing the same phenomenon”. Elliot 1988, id., at 536. 
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reciprocal invocation of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine (or 
equivalent lines of reasoning) to restrict the application of valid federal 
statutes is slim indeed. In his 1988 article, he cites only a handful of 
cases,81 two of which, Jabour and Dominion Stores, as discussed above, 
do not read down federal statutes to protect the exclusivity of provincial 
areas of jurisdiction. Twenty years later, in a 2008 article, Elliot was able 
to provide two additional examples: 
One is Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co., in which the Court 
interpreted a limitation period in the federal Railway Act to be 
applicable only to civil causes of action created by the Act itself in 
order to protect from federal incursion what the Court saw as exclusive 
provincial jurisdiction over the barring of common law tort actions. 
And more recently, in Isen v. Simms, the Court read down a provision 
of the Canada Shipping Act that limited the quantum of damage awards 
in tort actions involving ships in order to protect what it saw as 
exclusive provincial jurisdiction over liability in such actions.82 
Elliot’s excavation of the case law helps provide some building 
blocks on which the courts can build to make the interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrine operate in a truly reciprocal manner consistent with 
the federal principle. The Clark case in particular is a better example, 
compared to those cited by Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western 
Bank, of the use of the language of applicability and reading down to 
protect exclusive provincial powers from federal invasion.  
Still, one cannot help but be struck by the paltry sum and signifi-
cance of the examples provided by Elliot, especially when contrasted 
with the much larger number of cases explicitly invoking the interjuris-
dictional immunity doctrine to restrict the application of otherwise valid 
provincial statutes in a wide range of significant contexts.83 The fact 
remains that the courts have developed a significant body of jurispru-
dence defining core elements of federal heads of power and restricting 
the application of otherwise valid provincial laws to prevent impairment 
of those core matters. The courts have simply not engaged in the tasks of 
defining core elements of provincial heads of power and restricting the 
application of otherwise valid federal laws to prevent impairment of 
                                                                                                             
81  Elliot 1988, supra, note 71, at n. 70-75. 
82  Elliot 2008, supra, note 71, at 469 (footnotes omitted). 
83  The case law is thoroughly canvassed in Elliott 1988, supra, note 71; Elliot 2008, supra, 
note 71; Hogg, supra, note 45, c. 15.8; Bell Canada 1988, supra, note 63; Canadian Western Bank, 
supra, note 2, at paras. 33-66. 
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those core matters. Indeed, on a number of occasions, when expressly 
invited to invoke the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in a reciprocal 
manner to protect exclusive heads of provincial power from federal 
encroachment, the Supreme Court has refused to do so.84 
In light of the courts’ consistently one-sided invocation of the inter-
jurisdictional immunity doctrine, it would more accurately reflect 
judicial practice if it were renamed the “doctrine of greater federal 
exclusivity”.85 We should not shirk from this reality or mince words 
about it. From the perspective of the federal principle, the one-sided 
invocation of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is a significant 
problem that needs to be confronted openly and honestly. The doctrine, 
in judicial practice, by treating federal powers as being more strongly 
exclusive than provincial powers, runs blatantly counter to the federal 
principle (and its corollary, the principle of equal autonomy), an underly-
ing principle of the Constitution that the Court has granted superordinate 
interpretive importance. 
The Court could bring the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine into 
line with the federal principle in one of two ways. First, it could abandon 
the doctrine altogether, given that it runs counter to the “dominant tide” 
of the modern flexible approach to federalism promoted by other 
constitutional doctrines. Second, it could commit itself to invoking the 
doctrine reciprocally to protect the core of provincial heads of power 
from being impaired by the application of valid federal laws. Either of 
these options would involve significant departures from settled jurispru-
dence, giving rise to the usual concerns about the creation of uncertainty 
and the disruption of expectations and arrangements built up in reliance 
upon the existing state of the law.86  
The joint opinion of Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western Bank 
did not embrace either of these drastic options for aligning the interjuris-
dictional immunity doctrine with the federal principle. They favoured an 
                                                                                                             
84  See Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 
S.C.J. No. 1, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), 
[1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.); Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada 
(Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission), [1989] S.C.J. No. 84, [1989] 2 
S.C.R. 225 (S.C.C.); Insite, supra, note 38, at paras. 53-70. 
85  Elliot suggests that it be renamed “the doctrine of exclusivity”. Elliot 2008, supra, note 
71, at 495. 
86  See Wade Wright, “Facilitating Intergovernmental Dialogue: Judicial Review of the 
Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada” in Jamie Cameron & Bruce Ryder, eds. (2010) 
51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 625, at 648-49. 
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incremental approach.87 They narrowed the doctrine’s scope by defining 
the protected core of federal powers restrictively88 and by requiring 
“impairment” of, rather than a mere impact on, a core power.89 They 
disfavoured “intensive reliance” on the doctrine.90 They described it as “a 
doctrine of limited application”91 or “very restricted scope”.92 In general, 
they wrote, the doctrine should 
be reserved for situations already covered by precedent. This means, in 
practice, that it will be largely reserved for those heads of power that 
deal with federal things, persons or undertakings, or where in the past 
its application has been considered absolutely indispensable or 
necessary to enable Parliament or a provincial legislature to achieve the 
purpose for which exclusive legislative jurisdiction was conferred, as 
discerned from the constitutional division of powers as a whole, or 
what is absolutely indispensable or necessary to enable an undertaking 
to carry out its mandate in what makes it specifically of federal (or 
provincial) jurisdiction.93 
By implying that precedent favours the doctrine’s reciprocal invoca-
tion, this passage obscures the contradiction between confining the 
doctrine to precedent and ensuring that it applies reciprocally to protect 
provincial powers, as demanded by the federal principle. The truth is 
that, apart from the ruling of the majority of the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal in the Insite case currently on appeal to the Supreme Court,94 
the doctrine has never been considered, to use the formulation of Binnie 
and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western Bank quoted above, “absolutely 
indispensable or necessary to enable a provincial legislature to achieve 
the purpose for which exclusive legislative jurisdiction was conferred”. 
With hindsight, we can now imagine that Binnie and LeBel JJ., who 
have since emerged in the Court’s more recent federalism rulings as 
leaders of the centralist and decentralist blocs respectively, might have 
been able to achieve agreement on the text of their joint opinion in 
Canadian Western Bank by burying in ambiguities some disagreements 
about the pace and direction of needed doctrinal reform. Several recent 
                                                                                                             
87  Id., at 649. 
88  Supra, note 2, at paras. 50-52. 
89  Id., at para. 48. 
90  Id., at para. 47. 
91  Id., at para. 33. 
92  Id., at para. 38. 
93  Id., at para. 77. 
94  Supra, note 38. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)   EQUAL AUTONOMY IN CANADIAN FEDERALISM 589 
 
cases involving the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine have landed 
squarely on the uncertain terrain produced by these ambiguities embed-
ded in Canadian Western Bank. 
The Lacombe and COPA cases provided the Court with an opportu-
nity to restrict the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine by permitting the 
challenged municipal and provincial laws regulating land use to apply to 
the location of aerodromes in the province. A number of commentators 
on the Canadian Western Bank ruling anticipated that it heralded a more 
restricted role for the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in the 
future.95 However, the rulings in Lacombe and COPA leave one wonder-
ing whether that will turn out to be the case. The majority opinions of 
McLachlin C.J.C. in both cases invoked the doctrine in less than compel-
ling circumstances with surprisingly little hesitation. The spirit of 
Canadian Western Bank is not evident in the Chief Justice’s opinions.  
In COPA, at issue was whether Quebec’s Act respecting the preserva-
tion of agricultural land and agricultural activities96 could restrict the 
location of aerodromes authorized by the federal Aeronautics Act.97 All 
members of the Court agreed that the provincial Act was valid and that 
precedent established that the location of aerodromes is a matter that falls 
within the core of Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction in relation to 
aeronautics.98 The issue, then, was whether the application of the Act 
would impair federal jurisdiction in relation to aeronautics. The Chief 
Justice defined impairment as “a serious or significant intrusion on the 
exercise of the federal power”.99 She then found that this test was met 
because the application of the Quebec legislation would force Parliament 
to enact its own legislation if it wanted to have the final say on the 
location of aerodromes: 
                                                                                                             
95  Peter W. Hogg & Rahat Godil, “Narrowing Interjurisdictional Immunity” in Jamie Came-
ron, Patrick Monahan & Bruce Ryder, eds. (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 623; John G. Furey, “Interjuris-
dictional Immunity: The Pendulum Has Swung” in id., 597; Elizabeth Edinger, “Back to the Future 
with Interjurisdictional Immunity: Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta; British Columbia v. Lafarge 
Canada Inc.” (2008) 66 Adv. 553; Carissima Mathen & M. Plaxton, “Developments in Constitution-
al Law: The 2006-2007 Term” (2007) 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 111, at 131-36. See also Elliot 2008, supra, 
note 71. 
96  R.S.Q., c. P-41.1. 
97  R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, s. 4.9(e). 
98  COPA, supra, note 24, at paras. 37-40, per McLachlin C.J.C.; Lacombe, supra, note 24, 
at para. 154, per Deschamps J. 
99  COPA, id., at para. 45. 
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Instead of the current permissive regime, Parliament would be obliged 
to legislate for the specific location of particular aerodromes. Such a 
substantial restriction of Parliament’s legislative freedom constitutes an 
impairment of the federal power.100 
In Lacombe, the Chief Justice found the by-law prohibiting water 
aerodromes on recreational lakes to be invalid as an invasion of exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction in relation to aeronautics. This conclusion 
followed a surprisingly tortuous reading of the by-law that disconnected 
it from the municipality’s other by-laws dealing with land use, and thus 
denied it validity through the ancillary powers doctrine. Even if she had 
found the by-law to be valid, she stated that  
[it] would be inapplicable to the extent [it prohibited water 
aerodromes], under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. A 
prohibition on aerodromes, even as part of a broad class of land uses, 
would result in an unacceptable narrowing of Parliament’s legislative 
options. As in COPA, this would have the effect of impairing the core 
of the federal power over aeronautics.101 
Treating a narrowing of Parliament’s legislative options as sufficient 
to amount to an impairment of the exercise of its core jurisdiction, thus 
requiring the reading down of a valid provincial law, turns the reasoning 
in Canadian Western Bank on its head. One of the reasons Binnie and 
LeBel JJ. gave for restricting the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is 
that it risks creating undesirable legal vacuums.102 In COPA and La-
combe, the Chief Justice stated that avoiding legal vacuums by permit-
ting valid provincial laws to apply to core federal subject matters is 
problematic because it forces Parliament to legislate if it wishes to 
overcome or supplement the rules set out in provincial law. In other 
words, the Chief Justice would rather risk legal vacuums than risk 
interference with Parliament’s legislative agenda.  
While the Chief Justice’s opinions in the aerodrome cases are sensi-
tive to the need to respect Parliament’s autonomy, they do not evince the 
same sensitivity to why it might be important to enable local citizens to 
have a say in the location of aerodromes. Justice Deschamps’ opinions in 
Lacombe and COPA, in contrast, emphasized the principle of subsidiarity 
as a way of ensuring that provincial claims to exercise their autonomous 
                                                                                                             
100  Id., at para. 48. 
101  Lacombe, supra, note 24, at para. 66. 
102  Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2, at para. 44. 
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powers are treated with equal respect,103 concluded that the municipal 
by-law and provincial statute at issue fell short of impairing Parliament’s 
ability to regulate the location of aerodromes,104 and closed with a plea 
for the preservation of space for local democratic institutions to express 
local concerns: 
There is something fundamentally incoherent in the interpretation of 
the rules of our federalist system if a municipality is unable to establish 
reasonable limits to ensure that uses of its territory are compatible with 
one another where no activities falling under the core of a protected 
federal power are actually impaired and there is no inconsistency with 
federal legislation. Whether in the case of a pilot training school that is 
authorized to operate in an urban environment (more than 500 aircraft 
movements a day) or in one involving low-level float plane takeoffs 
over a public beach, the governments that are closest to citizens and 
have jurisdiction over land use planning should have reasonable 
latitude to act where the central government fails to do so or proves to 
be indifferent.105 
The “something fundamentally incoherent” is the failure to accord 
equal weight and consideration to the importance of provincial claims to 
autonomy, grounded in valid local concerns falling squarely within 
exclusive provincial jurisdiction, pursuant to section 92(13), to enact 
laws in relation to the use of real property. The majority took the position 
that provinces and municipalities must be denied any constitutional 
capacity whatsoever to regulate the location of aerodromes through the 
valid exercise of their exclusive jurisdiction, because allowing the 
provinces to do so would require Parliament to legislate on the matter if 
it wishes to assert the primacy of its policy objectives in its area of 
exclusive jurisdiction. The provincial exercise of exclusive jurisdiction is 
denied so that potential future federal deliberations about whether to 
exercise its exclusive jurisdiction can be made in an unoccupied field, 
unhindered by any concerns about provincial rules. By according a 
remarkable degree of solicitude to the need to protect the exclusivity of 
federal jurisdiction in relation to the location of aerodromes, and demon-
strating nothing approximating the same degree of concern for protecting 
the exclusivity of provincial jurisdiction overlapping with the same 
                                                                                                             
103  Lacombe, supra, note 24, at para. 109. 
104  Lacombe, id., at paras. 156-168; COPA, supra, note 24, at paras. 87-91. 
105  Lacombe, id., at para. 185. 
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subject matter, the majority opinions in Lacombe and COPA are inconsis-
tent with the federal principle and its corollary, the principle of equal 
autonomy. 
The aerodrome cases were a missed opportunity to close the gap be-
tween the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine and the federal principle. 
Rather than building on the apparent change of direction signalled in 
Canadian Western Bank, and restricting the invocation of the doctrine to 
protect federal heads of power, the Chief Justice’s majority opinions 
appear to have headed in the opposite direction. 
The Court had an opportunity to close the gap between the interjuris-
dictional immunity doctrine and the federal principle from the other 
direction: that is, by invoking it to protect a matter at the core of provin-
cial jurisdiction from impairment through the application of federal law. 
In Insite,106 a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that 
the possession and trafficking offences in the federal Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act107 had to be read down, or restricted in their applica-
tion, to avoid impairing the operation of Insite, a provincially authorized 
safe injection site operating in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver. The 
majority opinion of Huddart J.A. picked up on the suggestion in Cana-
dian Western Bank that the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine should 
be reciprocal. She noted: 
It would be difficult to envisage anything more at the core of a 
hospital’s purpose, than the determination of the nature of the services 
it provides to the community it serves. Indeed, it would be difficult to 
envisage anything more at the core of the province’s general 
jurisdiction over health care than decisions about the nature of the 
services it will provide …108 
Applying the CDSA to Insite’s activities would make it impossible 
for the facility to deliver safe injection services, which ought to qualify 
as impairment of exclusive provincial jurisdiction in relation to hospitals, 
the medical profession and health care. As Huddart J.A. wrote, “[i]f 
interjurisdictional immunity is not available to a provincial undertaking 
on the facts of this case, then it may well be said the doctrine is not 
reciprocal and can never be applied to protect exclusive provincial 
                                                                                                             
106  Supra, note 38. 
107  S.C. 1996, c. 19 [hereinafter “CDSA”]. 
108  Supra, note 38, at para. 157 (emphasis in original). 
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powers.”109 That appeared to be the view of Smith J.A. in her dissent. 
Quoting from Canadian Western Bank, she endorsed “a limited applica-
tion of the doctrine … to circumstances in which previous case law has 
already relied on its use.”110 
Based on the 2010 rulings, it was difficult to predict which view 
would prevail on appeal to the Supreme Court in Insite. Would it be the 
novel invocation of interjurisdictional immunity by Huddart J.A. relying 
on Canadian Western Bank’s support of reciprocity, at least in theory? Or 
would it be Smith J.A.’s refusal to invoke interjurisdictional immunity 
based on the restriction of the doctrine to situations already covered by 
precedent? One would have expected that Deschamps and LeBel JJ. 
would be sympathetic to Huddart J.A.’s approach. In Lacombe, 
Deschamps J. expressed the view that “the recognition of new provincial 
cores of power” should not be precluded by Canadian Western Bank.111 
While McLachlin C.J.C. did not directly address the possibility of the 
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine evolving in a reciprocal direction in 
the aerodrome cases, she described the doctrine in one-way terms, as 
aimed at the preservation of federal core competencies from provincial 
impairment.112 Justice Deschamps picked up on this and accused the 
Chief Justice of “getting away from both the letter and the spirit of 
Canadian Western Bank when she suggests that the doctrine of inter-
jurisdictional immunity is limited to the protection of federal powers”.113 
The Court ended up siding with Smith J.A., thus continuing its tradi-
tion of giving a cold shoulder to provincial attempts to invoke interjuris-
dictional immunity. In her opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court, the 
Chief Justice noted that the proposed invocation of the interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrine to protect the exclusivity of the core of provincial 
health jurisdiction is not supported by precedent and runs against the 
courts’ desire to restrict the doctrine’s operation.114 Moreover, the Chief 
Justice wrote, the argument rests on a broad and ill-defined definition of 
core health matters and risks creating legal vacuums.115  
                                                                                                             
109  Id., at para. 176. 
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The Insite ruling signals that all members of the Court are content to 
adhere to the doctrinal status quo, with its yawning gap between the 
federal principle and the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. Not even 
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. — perhaps surprisingly given the strength of 
their opinions in the 2010 aerodrome cases — were willing to take steps 
to close the gap in Insite. 
V. EQUAL AUTONOMY AND DE FACTO CONCURRENCY 
A second way in which the doctrinal structure of division of powers 
jurisprudence poses a threat to the federal principle is through the 
substantial growth of de facto areas of concurrent jurisdiction. Large and 
liberal interpretations of federal and provincial heads of power, supple-
mented by the principle of dynamic interpretation (or the “living tree” 
principle), expand the possibilities for overlapping jurisdiction. Likewise, 
liberal resort to the pith and substance doctrine, the ancillary powers 
doctrine and the double aspect doctrine leave ample room for overlap 
and interplay between federal and provincial legislation.  
While there is much to commend in the Supreme Court’s modern and 
flexible approach to federalism from a democratic perspective, it poses a 
real danger to the federal principle.116 It is not just a win-win situation. 
The reason for this is the rule of federal paramountcy discussed above.117 
William Lederman expressed the concern well: 
… there is still need to avoid over-extension of the definition of the 
scope of federal categories of power if balance is to be maintained in 
our constitution. Complete concurrency of federal powers with 
provincial ones, coupled with the doctrine of federal paramountcy, 
would mean the end of a balanced federal system in Canada. The trend 
to increased concurrency then may have its dangers for the autonomy 
of the provinces, though so far [writing in the mid-1960s] the main 
effect of the trend has been to uphold provincial statutes.118 
Because the rule of federal paramountcy renders conflicting provincial 
laws inoperative, areas subject to concurrent powers are in fact areas in 
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which Parliament is ultimately supreme and the provincial legislatures 
are subordinate. The provinces have only a conditional autonomy in 
areas of de jure or de facto concurrent jurisdiction. Rather than exercis-
ing guaranteed, exclusive jurisdiction, they are put in the position of 
supplicants to the federal government. To secure legislative space for the 
pursuit of distinct policy objectives, the provinces must negotiate with a 
national government that is holding the legal trump card — the federal 
paramountcy rule — in its hand. If the provincial pursuit of distinct 
policies in the growing areas of shared jurisdiction is conditional upon 
federal consent or forbearance, the provinces cannot be confident that 
their autonomy will be secured in the future.119 For this reason, the 
combined effect of the federal paramountcy rule and the growth of areas 
of de facto concurrency poses a serious threat to the federal principle and 
its corollary, the principle of equal autonomy. 
As long as the areas subject to de facto concurrent powers grow 
modestly and incrementally, the dangers to the federal principle may not 
be considered to be particularly serious, although over time they may 
become so. However, when the federal government seeks to persuade the 
courts to expand the scope of de facto concurrent jurisdiction more 
dramatically, especially in areas that have traditionally fallen within 
provincial jurisdiction, this is likely to provoke a defensive judicial 
response seeking to preserve balance in the division of powers. This is 
precisely what happened in the AHRA Reference when the federal 
Parliament sought to assert jurisdiction through the criminal law power, 
as Cromwell J. described it, over “virtually every aspect of research and 
clinical practice in relation to assisted human reproduction”.120 Given 
that the controlled activities provisions of the AHRA would have enabled 
federal regulation of virtually all aspects of procedures such as donor 
insemination and in vitro fertilization, it is not surprising that Cromwell 
J. joined forces with Deschamps and LeBel JJ. to protect provincial 
jurisdiction over the regulation of these health services from being 
potentially eclipsed by federal paramountcy. 
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Similarly, the federal government is arguing that the validity of the 
proposed Canadian Securities Act, which is currently under considera-
tion by the Supreme Court of Canada, can be upheld as an example of 
the flexibility permitted by a broad interpretation of the “general regula-
tion of trade” power and by liberal interpretations of the pith and sub-
stance doctrine and the double aspect doctrine.121 Provincial legislative 
jurisdiction in relation to securities will not be superseded, the federal 
government argues; it will simply be supplemented by concurrent or 
overlapping federal jurisdiction. The assertion of such a significant new 
area of concurrent federal jurisdiction, where federal laws would become 
paramount over any conflicting provincial laws, and long-established 
provincial jurisdiction thus would become subordinate, has been re-
soundingly rejected by the Alberta Court of Appeal (in a 5-0 opinion)122 
and the Quebec Court of Appeal (in a 4-1 opinion).123 
Is the Supreme Court likely to agree with the appeal courts and find 
the proposed national securities legislation ultra vires? It is safe to 
predict that LeBel and Deschamps JJ. will not affirm the Act’s validity. 
Based on their recent rulings, there is a good chance that the Chief 
Justice and Binnie and Fish JJ. will find the proposed Canadian Securi-
ties Act valid. Justice Charron has retired and will not participate in the 
opinion. In predicting how the remaining three justices (Abella, Crom-
well and Rothstein JJ.) will decide, the federal government is no doubt 
concerned by the ruling in the AHRA Reference. Justice Cromwell quoted 
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. (who were joined by Abella and Rothstein JJ.) 
to the effect that “recourse to the criminal law power cannot … be based 
solely on concerns for efficiency or consistency, as such concerns, 
viewed in isolation, do not fall under the criminal law”.124 While every 
head of power has different characteristics, it seems no more likely that 
the “general regulation of trade” power will support the assertion of 
federal jurisdiction over all aspects of securities regulation in the absence 
                                                                                                             
121  For thoughtful discussions of the constitutional issues raised by the Canadian Securities 
Act Reference, see Jean Leclair, “‘Please Draw Me a Field of Jurisdiction’: Regulating Securities, 
Securing Federalism” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 555; Jean-François 
Gaudreault-DesBiens & Noura Karazivan, “On Polyphony and Paradoxes in the Regulation of 
Securities Within the Canadian Federation” (2010) 49 Can. Bus. L.J. 1. 
122  Reference re Securities Act (Can.), [2011] A.J. No. 228, 2011 ABCA 77 (Alta. C.A.). 
123  Quebec (Procureure générale) c. Canada (Procureur générale), [2011] J.Q. no 2940, 
2011 QCCA 591 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Quebec Securities Reference”]. 
124  AHRA Reference, supra, note 29, at para. 287 (translation). 
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of a reason more compelling than the desire for uniformity or efficiency 
that seems to underlie the initiative. 
Pushing the courts to expand federal jurisdiction into broad new ar-
eas traditionally regulated by the provinces, thus creating new areas 
subject to de facto concurrent power, is not likely to be a winning 
constitutional strategy. The threat to the federal principle, to the balance 
of the division of powers, is too palpable.  
Advocates of uniform schemes of national regulation in relation to 
assisted reproduction or securities need not despair. They may find 
comfort in knowing that a tried and true solution exists when Canadian 
legislatures seek to endow a single regulator with jurisdiction to address 
both provincial and federal aspects of a divided subject matter.125 For 
example, divided jurisdiction over trade, a fundamental feature of 
Canadian federalism since Parsons,126 can be overcome through a 
cooperative scheme of interlocking federal and provincial legislation, 
using techniques such as administrative delegation and incorporation by 
reference.127 This is precisely the approach that the courts have encour-
aged and sanctioned in contexts such as the regulation of trucking and 
agricultural products marketing.128 For example, in Fédération des 
producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, the Court upheld legisla-
tion that conferred jurisdiction over the intra- and extra-provincial 
marketing of chickens on a Quebec board. Justice Abella, writing for a 
unanimous Court, noted that “[e]ach level of government enacted laws 
and regulations, based on their respective legislative competencies, to 
create a unified and coherent regulatory scheme.”129 In response to 
objections to the scheme, she held that its constitutional validity is 
supported by “a venerable chain of judicial precedent”.130  
                                                                                                             
125  This paragraph draws on an exchange with Jean Leclair and the text of his article 
“‘Please Draw Me a Field of Jurisdiction’: Regulating Securities, Securing Federalism”, supra, note 
121, at 584-85. 
126  Citizen’s Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons, [1881] J.C.J. No. 1, 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.) 
(finding that the provinces have jurisdiction in relation to intra-provincial trade pursuant to s. 92(13), 
and Parliament has jurisdiction in relation to extra-provincial trade and the “general regulation of 
trade affecting the whole dominion” pursuant to s. 91(2)). 
127  See Hogg, supra, note 45, at c. 14.3-14.5. 
128  Prince Edward Island (Potato Marketing Board) v. H.B. Willis Inc., [1952] S.C.J. No. 31, 
[1952] 2 S.C.R. 392 (S.C.C.); Coughlin v. Ontario (Highway Transport Board), [1969] S.C.J. No. 
38, [1968] S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.); Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, 1970, [1978] 
S.C.J. No. 58, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 (S.C.C.); Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. 
Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.). 
129  Pelland, id., at para. 38. 
130  Id., at para. 52. 
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The federal government’s proposed Canadian Securities Act, in con-
trast, chooses to assert federal jurisdiction over both the intra- and extra-
provincial aspects of securities regulation, with no legislative support 
from the provinces. The proposed Act does provide, in section 250, that 
its key regulatory components will not come into force in a province 
without the written consent of the provincial Cabinet. While obtaining 
provincial executive consent to what is otherwise unilateral federal 
legislative action may be the wise and decent thing to do from a political 
perspective, from a constitutional perspective it is a very different beast 
from joint legislative action by a provincial legislature and Parliament, 
each acting within its protected exclusive sphere of jurisdiction. Execu-
tive agreement cannot alter the limits imposed on Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures by the constitutional division of powers. In other 
words, the proposed Act may be pursuing a kind of co-operative federal-
ism in a political sense, but it chooses a mechanism that is different from 
the kinds of co-operative federalism sanctioned, and indeed celebrated, 
by the Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional law. 
Rather than push the limits of the general regulation of trade power 
and strain the federal principle, if the federal government truly wants to 
pursue a constitutionally sound, cooperative approach to endowing a 
single regulator with jurisdiction over all aspects of securities regulation, 
it should follow the “well-established body of precedent upholding the 
validity of administrative delegation in aid of cooperative federalism”.131 
The facta of the British Columbia Attorney General and the Saskatche-
wan Attorney General in the federal reference urge just such a course.132 
It is also supported by the comments of Justice Michel Robert at the end 
of his opinion in Quebec Securities Reference: 
The centralized approach advanced by the proposed securities 
legislation can be pursued by the governments of this country if they so 
desire. Possible avenues include a law passed by Parliament that would 
complement provincial laws and that would regulate the interprovincial, 
                                                                                                             
131  Id, at para. 55. 
132  Factum of the Attorney General for Saskatchewan, Canadian Securities Act Reference, 
File No. 33718, at paras. 71-77; Factum of the Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian 
Securities Act Reference, File No. 33718, at paras. 90-104. Both facta note that a number of earlier 
proposals for a single national securities regulator relied on interlocking federal and provincial 
legislation and other constitutionally sound techniques that respect the division of powers. Given the 
availability of these valid means of establishing a single national securities regulator, the B.C. 
factum closes by noting that finding the proposed Act ultra vires would not be “the end of the 
matter; it is simply the beginning”: id., at para. 104. 
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international and criminal aspects of the trade in securities, an agreement 
putting in place a cooperative regime on the matter or a constitutional 
amendment. 
Conversely, one cannot interpret the jurisprudence regarding s. 91(2) 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 in a manner that would support such an 
initiative without the agreement of the provinces when their incapacity 
to regulate a sector of the economy has not been established. To do 
otherwise would be to assault the federal compromise made at the 
creation of our country and to threaten, all at the same time, the balance 
of powers between the two orders of government, the continued 
existence of the civil law of Québec and the existence of diverse 
common law approaches to private law in the other provinces and 
territories.133 
The type of cooperative approach to regulating the entirety of a mat-
ter with intra- and extra-provincial dimensions through interlocking 
federal and provincial legislation that was endorsed by Abella J. in 
Pelland, and by Robert C.J. in the Quebec Securities Reference, could be 
pursued likewise by agreement between the federal government and any 
provinces that are content to leave regulation of assisted reproduction to 
the federal Assisted Human Reproduction Agency. To allow Parliament 
to assert jurisdiction over the regulation of all aspects of assisted human 
reproduction or all aspects of the trade in securities would not be consis-
tent with contemporary Canadian understandings of the federal principle 
and its corollary, the principle of equal autonomy.  
                                                                                                             
133  Supra, note 123, at paras. 228-229. My translation of: 
 L’approche centralisée que la Proposition avance en matière de réglementation du 
commerce des valeurs mobilières peut validement être poursuivie par les gouvernements 
de ce pays s’ils le désirent. Les avenues possibles incluent une loi du Parlement qui serait 
complémentaire aux lois provinciales et qui réglementerait les aspects interprovinciaux, 
internationaux et criminels du commerce des valeurs mobilières, un accord mettant en 
place un régime coopératif en la matière ou une modification constitutionnelle.  
 À l’inverse, on ne saurait interpréter la jurisprudence relative au paragraphe 91(2) de 
la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 de manière à légitimer une telle initiative sans l’accord 
des provinces dans des cas où leur incapacité à réglementer un secteur de l’économie n’a 
pas été établie. En faire autant porterait atteinte au compromis fédératif à l’origine de la 
création de notre pays et menacerait à la fois l’équilibre des pouvoirs entre les deux or-
dres de gouvernement, la pérennité du droit civil québécois et l’existence d’une common 
law de droit privé diversifiée dans les autres provinces et territoires.  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Central to Canadian federalism jurisprudence is the principle of ac-
cording equal weight and consideration to the claims of provincial 
legislatures and the federal Parliament when they seek to exercise their 
autonomy to pursue distinct policy objectives within their respective 
spheres of legislative jurisdiction. I have argued that the apparently 
sudden emergence of stark differences of opinion on the Supreme Court 
of Canada in recent federalism cases was a predictable result of its 
engagement with issues that invoke features of the jurisprudence incon-
sistent with this principle, namely the asymmetrical interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrine and the growth in areas subject to de facto concurrent 
power. Unfortunately, in its 2010 rulings in the aerodrome cases (COPA 
and Lacombe), and its 2011 ruling in Insite, the Court missed an oppor-
tunity to push forward the spirit of Canadian Western Bank and narrow 
the gap between the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine and the federal 
principle. In the AHRA Reference, a slim majority of the Court rejected 
the attempt by the federal government to establish that the regulation of 
all aspects of assisted reproductive health services is a double aspect 
matter subject to de facto concurrent legislative jurisdiction. The federal 
government is likely to face similar difficulties obtaining a positive 
opinion from the Court on the validity of the proposed Canadian 
Securities Act, although it seems likely that the issue will split the Court 
down the middle. As was the case in the AHRA Reference, the outcome 
may turn on a single justice’s vote. This would not be a comfortable 
result for the Court or the federation. Rather than strain the limits of 
federal powers in a manner that threatens the federal principle, if federal 
and provincial governments are convinced of the value of a single 
national regulator in an area of shared jurisdiction, they would be well-
advised to pursue that goal through a constitutionally sound “Plan B”, 
namely, the enactment of a cooperative scheme of interlocking federal 
and provincial legislation endowing a single regulator with comprehen-
sive jurisdiction. 
